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1. Introduction* 
Economic development proceeds unevenly within, as between, nations. 
There is a wealth of literature which analyses regional development in 
real terms: in terms of factor endowments and movements, production 
patterns or market conditions. But the tendency in the literature is to 
ignore financial factors. 
There is a reason, rooted in the development of regional economics, for 
treating monetary factors as unimportant in regional development: 
regional economics was first seen as a special case of international 
economics (Oh Jin, 1933). Differences in rates of growth between regions 
were distinguished from international differences by not giving rise to 
overt balance of payments problems, since regions share the same 
currency. Money, therefore, caused no 'problems'. 
A second feature of the regional development literature is a tendency to 
treat capital as a factor which is at once physical and financial, as in much 
pre-Keynesian theory. In post-Keynesian theory, financial and real capital, 
though interlinked, are quite distinct and a common currency is only a part 
of the story of money. Money and finance profoundly affect an economy's 
rate of growth, both through the effect of the supply and demand for 
money on the rate of interest and directly through the banks' willingness 
and ability to lend. 
While we take it for granted that the essence of economic growth is capital 
accumulation and that investment and exports are the main sources of 
fluctuations in income and output, we argue in this paper, building on 
Chick's (1986, 1988) stages of banking development and Dow's (1987a, 
1987b) work on finance and regional development, that financial factors, 
especially banking systems, have an important role in regional, as in 
national, growth. 
Economic development is an historical process of change. Monetary 
systems too are constantly evolving, and the stage of their growth shapes 
economic possibilities and relationships. As the banking system of a 
country, viewed as a unit, progresses through different stages of 
development, changes in the theory of how that country's economy works 
become necessary. Similarly, banking relationships between regions may 
differ for different countries at the same time or the same country at 
different times, bringing different theories of regional development into 
play. 
It is from that perspective that we review the relationship between stages 
of banking development and the main theories of regional development. 
For example, the ability to create credit independently of saving -
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an ability crucial to Keynesian theory - is a property of banking systems 
only after they themselves have reached a certain stage of development 
and coherence. Theories of regional development coexist which differ as 
to the primacy of saving or of investment. We would argue that the choice 
between them depends on whether or not the relevant stage of banking 
development has been reached. 1 
Beyond the level of historical description and its importance to the choice 
of theory, we investigate the role of financial factors in setting up a 
particular dynamic of regional development which contributes to 
explaining uneven development independently of the current regional 
disposition of resources or of productivity. The following scenario outlines 
the operation of such a dynamic at a given stage of banking development. 
In Keynesian theory, the desire to borrow to finance new investment 
arises jointly from optimism about returns to the real investment and a 
need for financial capital, while lenders' terms depend on the optimism of 
both potential lenders and wealth-holders. The ability to lend depends to 
some degree, but only partly, on the available stock of financial capital. 
How important that stock is depends on the stage of development of the 
region's financial institutions, especially that of the banks. The regional 
pattern of borrowing and lending thus depends on the valuation of 
resources in each region, the distribution of wealth, and the liquidity 
preference of wealth-holders. These factors in turn determine the future 
of regional wealth-creation and the structure and level of production: 
there is a potential vicious circle here. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we outline the 
central propositions of the main theories of regional development as they 
are usually presented, noting any treatment of monetary factors. In 
section 3 we outline the major stages in the evolution of the banking 
system, paying particular attention to the significance of each stage for the 
relationship between saving and investment and the determination of the 
rate of interest. Then, in section 4, we apply the approach of section 3 to 
show how regional financial problems alter in different stages of banking 
development, emphasising the two groups of regional theory most 
amenable to this addition: cumulative causation theory and dependency 
theory. Mainstream neoclassical regional development theory is shown to 
imply contradictory assumptions about the monetary-institutional context 
of development. Our account of uneven regional development, provided by 
the combination of post-Keynesian monetary theory with elements of 
c!tlmulative causation theory and dependency theory, suggests some 
strong conclusions, which are outlined in the final section. 
2. Theories of Regional Development 
Underlying any perception of the process of regional development is a 
particular understanding of how the economy under scrutiny functions 
and how best to analyse it. Thus the general tenor of different theories of 
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regional development is consistent with the school of thought to which its 
expositors subscribe. The theories are bounded by neoclassical and 
Marxist theories, which, each in its own way, turn out to have little to say 
about persistent differences in regional development. The richest ground 
is where one expects to find it - in the middle, where the Keynesian 
theories of Regional Multipliers and Cumulative Causation and the neo-
Marxist Dependency Theory are to be found. 
2.1 Neoclassical theory 
The orthodox, neoclassical theory of regional development (see Holland, 
1976, Chapter 1, for a review) is set in a general equilibrium framework, 
continuing to follow along the same lines as the orthodox theory of 
international trade, as originally developed in a unified approach by Ohlin 
(1933). Full general equilibrium requires factor-price equalisation and full 
employment of factors. Thus in equilibrium, incomes may differ between 
regions only as a result of differing factor endowments (e.g. a higher skill 
level in the labour force) and no unemployment can persist for long. The 
work of Lipsey (1960) and Archibald (1969) focuses on regional 
differences in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment; these 
differences, however, are assumed to be short-run, that is, temporary. The 
dynamics of mainstream theories develop adjustment mechanisms by 
which regional equilibrium, once disturbed, is restored and regional 
disparities are eliminated. (In an extreme case, Courchene, 1981, denies 
even the possibility of regional disequilibrium; he regards an observed 
disparity in regional earned incomes as an equilibrium response to 
national government welfare or regional policy.) 
In this mainstream theory, which to many, despite its disparity with 
observed fact, is identified with regional economics, investment finance is 
equated with saving. Financial institutions intermediate between savers 
and investors, and funds systematically flow to those projects with the 
highest perceived rate of return, wherever they may be. Hence if one 
region is growing more rapidly, implying a higher marginal efficiency of 
investment (mei) in that region, investment there will increase more 
rapidly for a time. The inflow of capital will lower rates of return in the 
receiving regions and raise the average return on remaining projects in 
the exporting regions, equalising the mei and the rate of return on 
financial capital and bringing both back into line with the rate of return in 
other regions (Mundell, 1976). Financial and real capital lose their 
separate identities in this theory. 
Disequilibrium, in the form of different rates of growth between regions, 
may be the result of an inequality of saving and investment in each region. 
If exports from one region are low relatively to imports, there will be 
insufficient saving to finance investment locally. The resulting excess 
demand for funds will be met by an inflow of funds from the regions with 
high exports and thus excess saving (Scitovsky, 1957). Insofar as financial 
markets are considered separately, integrated national financial markets 
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are assumed to exist and to contribute substantially to equalising rates of 
regional development. 
Although financial flows are a key factor in adjustment, mainstream 
theorists argue that regiona/financial conditions are unimportant: there is 
a single, national cost of borrowing saving. Regions benefit from having 
extra-regional outlets for saving when the return on local investment is 
low and from extra-regional sources of saving when the return on local 
investment is high. Regional banks are also cushioned from variations in 
their balance sheets by a source of liquidity in the form of national 
financial assets, or 'generalised claims' (Ingram, 1959): financial 
instruments such as government bonds which are traded nationally. 
Faced with a reduction in deposits, banks can maintain their reserves by 
selling generalised claims rather than by calling in advances or restricting 
new lending. 
It can be seen that mainstream theory relies on a capital market in which 
information is excellent if not perfect, and a financial system whch allows 
perfect mobility of capital. (See, for example, the fully specified general 
equilibrium model of regional portfolio behaviour in Goodhart, 1975, 
Chapter 14). The banking system is assimilated to the capital market, for it 
has the properties of a pure intermediary between saving and investment 
and so contributes nothing beyond the direct lending mechanisms of the 
capital market. As befits this institutional structure, a loanable-funds 
theory is used, equating finance with saving and giving saving causal 
priority over investment. 
When investment must wait for saving to finance it, growth is likely to be 
slow. The slower-growing regions are spared the worst of this, in 
mainstream theory, by tt,e flow of savings from other regions, though 
(appropriately for a timeless theory) the rate of adjustment is of little 
concern. Pfister (1960) and Whitman (1967) point out, however, that 
regional differences in export performance and ability to attract capital are 
in general neither temporary nor self-adjusting. Low export growth tends 
to mean poor investment prospects regardless of how much saving is 
available and is thus more likely to encourage continued outflows than 
inflows. By the time this process raises the return on the remaining capital 
to that of capital in other regions, there rnay be very little economic activity 
left. 
~2 Marxian theory 
Orthodox Marxian theory also has had little to contribute to explanations 
of uneven regional development, although Marx did discuss particuJar 
regional questions and posited an antagonism between country and city. 
A variety of theories has been developed in an attempt to provide a 
Marxian interpretation of regional development - examples are 
applications of Lenin's theory (1916) of imperialism to regions and 
Mandel's theory (1973) of the regional disposition of the reserve army of 
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the unemployed. But spatial divisions cut across class divisions, so there 
has been a strong resistance amongst orthodox Marxists to probing 
regional questions for fear of fostering divisions within the working class. 
Edel et. al. (1978) punctuate an excellent review of the radical regional 
literature with the observation that none of these theories provides a 
satisfactory class-based analysis. 
Marxian theory tends to concentrate on 'real' factors. As an exception, 
Lenin's theory (op. cit.) of imperialism emphasised portfolio investment 
governed by investors in the economic centre of power working in 
conjunction with the financial institutions, as in the German model. 
Money is important primarily in the sense that the bankers who lend it 
have a share of the surplus generated by the exploited regions. This for 
Lenin is the only significance of the distinction between financial and 
physical capital. That Marxian theory continues to suppress the 
significance of monetary factors is evidenced by the ambivalence of many 
Marxian theorists toward the possibility of independent financial causes 
of crisis (see e.g. Harvey, 1982, Chapter 10)2 . 
2 .3 Dependency theory 
Dependency theory, a modern development of Lenin 's approach, (Baran, 
1957; Cardoso and Falletto, 1969) is most closely identified with the case 
of Latin America. (For a summary and critical review see Palma, 1981.) It 
accepts uneven regional development as an inherent feature of capitalist 
economies and provides a systematic explanation: the nature of a region's 
pattern of trade and investment exercises a formative influence on the 
region's economic structure and development. 
A country's regions are divided into those constituting the Centre and 
those in the Periphery. 'Development' in the Periphery is dominated by the 
imperatives of growth in the Centre: it takes the form of investment 
projects decided by the Centre and designed to generate a surplus for the 
use of the Centre. As a result of this investment, the Peripheral regions 
become dependent on the Centre for markets for their products, for 
technology and for finance, resulting in the peripheral regions' continued 
dependency and relative underdevelopment. 
Where Lenin had emphasised portfolio investment, modern dependency 
theorists focus on real, direct investment these days especially by 
multinational corporations. Investment is governed by the marginal 
efficiency of projects as perceived by the Centre and as they serve the 
needs of the Centre, rather than by the expected return to members of the 
Periphery or of the 'whole economy'. A cash crop is the classic example: by 
definition the crop exceeds the producer's own needs; its expanded 
production would have no value if there were no market. The producer 
here is a region; the crop is destined for export to the Centre. 
The concept of regionally distinct me i's marks a sharp departure from neo-
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classical theory, where the interests of separate regional populations are 
not considered; a given project has a unique marginal efficiency, which 
depends on technology and the marketability of the product in the country 
as a whole. There is a kind of 'law of one price' for the mei in mainstream 
theory. 
Not only can regional mei's diverge, but because of growth in the Centre 
the divergence can persist. Investment in the Periphery often 
concentrates on food and raw materials, to support the Centre's industrial 
progress. Continued growth in the Centre counteracts the tendency of the 
mei - viewed from the Centre - of. these Periphery products to fall in the 
long run.3 
The instability of earnings from primary products and the . long-term 
adverse shift in the terms of trade of these products against manufactured 
goods is familiar from the international development literature. (For recent 
assessments see Spraos, 1980; Thirlwall and Bergevin, 1985). These 
factors contribute to market uncertainty, at times amounting to 
precariousness, in the Periphery, and help to perpetuate dependency. 
Fluctuating product prices may, but need not. add to uncertainty by 
inducing fluctuations in investment in the Periphery. 
The way investment might be affected depends on precisely what role the 
Centre investors play. If they have taken ownership in Periphery land, 
mines or industry and seek profit, unstable and, a fortiori, declining 
markets should result in declining investment. If the Centre's involvement 
is merely to provide finance to Periphery entrepreneurs, the Centre's 
concern is to see that interest payments are covered, but fluctuations of 
profit over and above what is owing to them do not matter unless 
bankruptcy is threatened. Thus if the role of the Centre is purely that of 
rentier, investment may continue even when markets for Periphery 
products are poor; the Periphery bears the full burden of the fluctuations. 
It can be seen that dependency theory has two essential features: the 
existence of Periphery products with a value to the Centre which is 
continually greater than their value to the Periphery, and as a corollary, a 
continued, if at times erratic, flow of funds directed by the Centre to 
investment in those products. That funds should flow to investments with 
an expected high rate of return is not surprising. From the point of view of 
mainstream theory what needs to be explained is the failure of the 
marginal efficiency of these investments to fall. This is perhaps explained 
a~ least at the beginning of the process by the roles of technology and 
economies of scale in encouraging ever more specialisation in 
manufacturing in the Centre, which continually maintains the value to the 
Centre of Periphery food and raw materials. The roots of dependency 
would seem to lie in the nature of the regions' resources, but the relative 
position of the two regions is reinforced by the financial power of the 
Centre. 
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The monetary aspect of the process of creating and maintaining 
dependency is not emphasised in the dependency-theory literature. We 
shall show in the next section however, that monetary factors can 
reinforce the real process. This will be done after we discuss neo-
Keynesian theory, including cumulative causation, which also, though in 
a different way, plays down monetary factors but is amenable to their 
inclusion. 
2.4 Keynesian theories 
In common with dependency theory, Keynesian theories acknowledge 
and provide explanations for uneven development between regions. 
Regional multiplier theory, which originated in the quite different real 
context of the British economy, applies the familiar idea of induced 
expenditure to the question of uneven regional growth and employment: 
those regions which get investment expenditure will be further favoured 
by the multiplier. (For a critical review see Wilson, 1968.) Economic 
success is thus to some extent self-reinforcing: investment in a region 
improves the level of activity in that region and attracts further 
investment. Depressed regions become unattractive to potential 
investors, lose income and become more depressed. If labour responds by 
moving to more prosperous regions, they deprive the depressed region of 
their unemployment benefit. These effects, it need hardly be said, are 
precisely the opposite of the evening-out of growth rates predicted by 
mainstream theory. 
The theory of cumulative causation includes a dynamic interplay between 
investment and productivity growth to reinforce regional differences. The 
theory originates with Myrdal (1957) and has been taken up by 
Keynesians, notably Kaldor (1970) and Thirlwall (1980, 1986). Cumulative 
causation theory stresses the competitive advantages enjoyed by those 
regions which are already most developed. Growth itself generates 
dynamic economies of scale, by embodying new technology, expanding 
markets and the like. The faster-growing regions have faster productivity 
growth, making it progressively harder for the slower regions to compete. 
These negative, 'backwash' effects are to some extent compensated by 
the positive effects which spread from the faster-growing regions, for 
example the transfer of new technology from the advanced regions, an 
improvement in the market for their products resulting from growth in the 
advanced regions. (Myrdal, 1957, in fact argued that spread effects tended 
to dominate backwash effects amongst regions, though not amongst 
nations.) ' 
Cumulative causation theory shares with dependency theory the idea of 
regional disparities in marginal efficiencies of investment. Indeed in the 
absence of balance of payments constraints, as is appropriate for regional 
analysis,4 cumulative causation theory suggests that the disparities will 
tend to widen, until a growth ceiling or cyclical turning point is reached. 
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The disparities grow for reasons endogenous to the theory: cumulative 
causation theory does not appeal to disparities of power other than those 
generated by the regional economies themselves. 
Not much has been made of the financial aspects of cumulative causation 
theory, except to argue that financial institutions share in the dynamic 
economies of scale which characterise businesses in the Centre (to carry 
over the language of dependency theory). This argument would suggest 
lower borrowing costs in the Centre, but this reinforcement of regional 
disparity is not made use of in cumulative causation theory. Quite the 
contrary: Kaldor's (1970) version· of the theory parallels his closed-
economy Keynesianism is explicitly assuming that the supply of money is 
endogenous at both the national and regional levels; banks are prepared to 
supply advances indefinitely at a set interest rate and acquire the 
necessary reserves to support the new deposits after the fact. 
The banking behaviour Kaldor assumes is far from universal. We shall 
argue below that such behaviour emerged only rather recently. For a 
detailed examination of the institutional preconditions for an infinitely-
elastic supply of finance see Chick (1988). 
In Kaldor's theory, all potential borrowers face the same interest rate; 
there is a unified capital market. Given the interest rate (however 
determined) it is (in stark contrast to dependency theory) up to the 
borrowers to assess their expectations of rate of return in comparison to 
that rate. If they decide to invest, the money is forthcoming. Money plays 
no active role in promoting uneven development. 
As they stand, in neither dependency theory nor cumulative causation 
theory are monetary factors given much scope to influence regional 
development. We attempt to rectify this after discussing, in the next 
section, the dynamics of monetary development against which real 
development takes place. 
3. Stages of Banking Development 
Economic development takes place in and interacts with a changing 
monetary environment. Changes in monetary institutions in ·turn 
influence both the course of development and the appropriateness of a 
given theory of development. Usually, however, the influence of 
institutional change is not acknowledged: indeed 'institution-free' theory 
t~nds to be valued as 'scientific' and an 'institutional' approach is seen as 
anti-theoretical. Thus although it has been argued that particularly in the 
monetary field it is necessary to connect theory with history (Hicks, 1967), 
we have the deposit multiplier theory of the supply of money both 
introduced (Crick, 1927; Phillips, 1920) and criticised (e.g. Tobin, 1963; 
Goodhart, 1973; Moore, 1985) without any reference to the stage of 
banking development which first gave rise to the theory and as the 
banking system developed beyond that stage, subsequently discredited it. s 
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Each stage of banking development has implications not only for the 
theory of money supply but also theories of saving, investment and 
interest, whether in the context of macroeconomics or in the theory of 
regional developent. In Chick (1986), five stages are identified, with the 
type of monetary theory relevant to each stage. A new stage emerged in 
the 1970s in many developed countries and it seems that the 1980s may 
bring further change (see The Economist, 1986). 
,, 
3.1 Stage One 
In the first stage of banking development, money is deposited in the banks 
as a relatively safe way to save, but claims on the banks are not widely 
used in transactions: bank liabilities are not yet a means of payment. In 
this stage, therefore, banks act purely as intermediaries between savers 
and the investors who borrow from them. Their lending is limited by their 
deposits: saving is necessarily prior to investment. 
In the absence of usury laws, the interest rate in this Stage is determined 
by the availability of saving relatively to investment demand. Investment, 
the driving force in growth and development, is constrained by saving. 
When entrepreneurs' expectations are buoyant, justifying payment of a 
relatively high interest rate on borrowed funds, banks would be able to 
offer higher rates on deposits, thus attracting deposits and increasing the 
availability of investment finance. The new income would generate 
additional saving, which would tend to lower the interest rate and further 
encourage investment. There is growth, but it is slow: investment must 
wait for new saving. 
3.2 Stage Two 
In the second stage, when bank notes and/or claims on deposits are used 
as a means of payment, two things follow: (i) people's holdings of bank 
liabilities represent money used to support consumption as well as 
representing saving, and (ii) mainly for that reason, the redeposit ratio 
from bank lending will be high. Now, reserves are the constraint, rather 
than savings. Given an addition to reserves (whether from a deposit new 
to the banking system, called a 'primary deposit', from capital inflows or 
through open market operations) banks taken as a whole can lend out a 
multiple of this amount, creating 'secondary' deposits as they finance 
investment, which generates income and the required saving. 
The willingness of an individual bank to lend beyond its reserves-in-hand 
depends on its forecast redeposit ratio but must perforce, be quite limited, 
the more so the more decentralised the banking system and the smaller 
the market share of the bank in question. The deposit multiplier may take 
quite some time to work itself out or may be only a theoretical limit to what 
the banks can do, while in practice they expand rather less. 
Not only the deposit multiplier but also the Keynesian income multiplier 
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comes into play at this Stage, as finance is separated from saving and the 
credit-creating ability of the banks allows investment to go ahead without 
the need for prior saving (Chick, 1983, Chapter 9, especially pp. 184-192). 
The rate of interest charged to borrowers may not even rise, if the 
optimism of entrepreneurs is shared by the bankers. Thus the cost and 
availability of finance are determined not only by bankers' expectations of 
the return to proposed investment projects but also their expectations, and 
the expectations of holders of financial assets, as to the returns on 
alternative assets. Keynesian liquidity preference comes into play, for 
alongside the development of the banks, markets for financial instruments 
such as government securities have also been developing. 
3.3 Stages Three and Four 
In stages three and four the banks are forged into a coherent system. 
Although the stages can be distinguished analytically, in practice the third 
stage is coterminous with, or in some countries even preceded by, the 
fourth stage. 
In the third stage of banking development, inter-bank lending arises. 
Individual banks can now more readily lend in excess of the initial increase 
in reserves. The banking system increases in coherence. Though the final 
total of credit creation is still dependent on the stock of bank reserves 
available to the system as a whole, bank expansion is more likely to reach 
the limits of the deposit multiplier and the multiplier process is more rapid. 
Other things equal this lowers the cost and increases the availability of 
investment finance; growth speeds up. 
In the fourth stage, a central monetary authority accepts the function of 
lender of last resort. The stock of bank reserves is now responsive to 
demand from the banks. Banks collectively expanding credit can now do so 
without risk of being caught short of reserves. 
Reserves are still exogenous as long as the central bank is prepared to 
manipulate their availability and/ or their price by open market operations. 
The effect of a lender-of-last-resort facility on banks' willingness to lend is 
greatest when the central bank has a stable interest policy and does not 
exact a penalty rate. In this set of circumstances the authorities are said to 
be acting as lender of first resort. Reserves are endogenous to the banking 
system, the volume of bank loans becomes fully demand determined, and 
the supply of deposits simply follows. 
.. 
The net effect of a more elastic reserve supply is an expansionary bias. If 
the 'real' opportunities are there, growth can proceed faster in this stage. 
On the other hand, at the same time, markets in financial assets are 
becoming ever more sophisticated and active. More credit will be 
demanded to finance activity in these markets, and this can be at the 
expense of financing 'productive' schemes. The balance between 
financial support of productive investment and speculation will be 
10 
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influenced by the judgement and behaviour of the monetary authorities. 
3 .4 Stage Five 
The fifth stage has been characterised by 'liability management', in which 
reserves are endogenous for a different reason. Banks meet all their 
demands for loans and 'fund' them by actively bidding for deposits with 
higher interest rates. Some of these deposits will, indirectly, give rise to 
reserves. Banks may even be driven by competitive forces to seek an 
increased share of overall lending by actively seeking both lending 
opportunities and deposits. Banks determined to expand may compete 
with securities for holders' funds over the whole range of rates. (This 
contrasts with Keynesian theory, in which a strong preference for liquidity 
usually coincides with low rates.) This competition cannot continue for 
long without pushing up interest rates on both deposits and loans, as the 
experience of the 1980s is proving. This places great stress on bank 
liquidity and profit margins. The next stage seems to be the management 
of the liquidity of bank assets through devising ways of marketing loans 
(The Economist, 1986; for comment see Gardener, 1988; Chick, 1988). 
One implication of Stage Five is that most loan requests which are 
considered credit-worthy will be met, irrespective of the will of the 
monetary authorities. The availability of finance, for investment or any 
other purpose, has become almost exclusively a market phenomenon, 
dependent on the cost of funds and on bankers' expectations. 
On the face of it one might think this phase favourable to rapid income 
growth. In practice, interest rates rose to heights which would discourage 
all but the most spectacularly productive investments. This is not to be 
attributed solely to the banks' having reached the fifth stage of 
development: the overall climate was inflationary. But for whatever 
reason, it is likely that much bank lending in this phase will be seen to have 
gone into speculative activity: one could argue that bank lending and trade 
in financial assets have broken away from the cycle in real trade and 
output. 
3.5 The capital market 
Along with the progress through stages of banking development, the 
capital market moves toward unification. A unified capital market is one in 
which information about investment opportunities flows freely and funds 
seek out the projects which are believed to carry the highest potential rate 
of return. 
Unification of the capital market need not run parallel to or depend upon 
the consolidation of the banking system. In, for example, the American 
banking system, where geographical separation was imposed by laws 
which have only recently been surmounted, the unification of the capital 
market was achieved at least in part by the nationwide spread of firms, 
which then borrowed in the cheapest capital market and spent in the 
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fastest-growing areas. However, it is difficult to imagine a unified capital 
market during Stage One of banking development or the persistence of 
wide variations in interest rates across regions by the time the banking 
system has reached Stage Three or Four. 
4. Monetary Aspects of Regional Development 
!he above_ outline of monetary development is a~enable to regional 
1nterpretat1on and can be used to contribute to both dependency theory 
and cumulative causation theory. 
4.1 Stage One of Banking Development 
It is readily apparent from the material presented in sections 2 and 3 that 
regional ~u_ltipli~r and cumulative causation theories, both of which give 
causal pr1or1ty to investment and assign an accommodating role to saving, 
are not consistent with a Stage One banking system. Perhaps the most 
useful aspect of the present approach is that the stage of banking 
development implied by a theory can offer a decisive test of relevance. 
As we have seen in section 2, in the orthodox theory of regional 
development, saving is the constraint on growth and interest rates are set 
b~ a loanable-funds mechanism. These features are really only consistent 
with stage one of banking development. 
Regional fin~ncial flows are the result of an excess supply of saving 
compared to investment opportunities in the region. The theory postu I ates 
that a region's investors will draw on extra-regional savings where 
regional savings fall short of investment needs. The larger the available 
pool of savings, the more investment there wi II be in regions short of local 
savings. The 'price' of savings will depend on competition for funds from 
other regions. But one might ask how the flow of funds takes place. It is 
natural to assume that the banks intermediate between savers in one 
regio_n and investors in the other; but it is a feature of the first stage of 
banking development that banks are small and the geographical purview 
of each is limited. The banks cannot provide, at this stage Df their 
de~elopment, the unified capital market on which the theory relies for its 
adJustment mechanism ~nd its single, national cost of borrowing. A 
perfectly informed, unified capital market is most unlikely to coincide with 
a Stage One banking system. 
~ similar, though weaker, charge of inconsistency can be levelled at 
Ingram's (1959) appeal to a 'stock of generalised claims' to act as an 
equilibrating mechanism by mitigating reserve losses and the deposit 
multi~l!er. While it is plausible to assume that the market for government 
secur1t1es would be better-informed and more unified than markets for 
investment loans, and that most Stage One banks would hold them the 
multiplier mechanism those holdings are supposed to ameliorate 'only 
comes into play in Stage Two and after; Ingram's point is a perfectly good 
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one, recognisably consistent with the asset management strategies of 
banks in the UK until they ran down their stocks of Government securities 
to a minimum, but it belongs to those theories which are consistent with 
those later stages, not to the loanable-funds theory within which it is 
presented. Banks used government securities markets as a reserve 
cushion before developing the interbank markets which characterise 
Stage Three. 
~ependency theory is not subject to the same inconsistency: either the 
investment in Periphery is directed by Centre entrepreneurs with Centre 
funds, or Periphery entrepreneurs seek loans from Centre institutions, for 
!he Centre is assumed to have sufficient funds to satisfy its own 
1nvestme.nt needs and still finance investment in the Periphery. The yield 
from capita I exports to the Periphery adds to Centre wealth. Increased 
income in the Periphery is obtained at the cost of growing dependency on 
the Cen~re for export markets and for finance and a growing disparity in 
economic development between the two classes of region. 
~tis ~n op~n - and important- question whether the progressive relative 
1mm 1serat1?n of the _Periphery would be made better or worse by a banking 
system which remains regionally distinct in this Stage. On the one hand, a 
separate banking system yields some measure of protection from 'take-
over~ by th~ Centre. On the other hand, if banking is regionally distinct, 
credit creation is constrained in each region by the region's deposits (in 
Stage One) or reserves (in Stage Two). The Periphery finds it more difficult 
than the Centre to attract and retain reserves and deposits, so the 
potential constraint is serious, especially if Periphery banks are in Stage 
One. 6 
4.2 Stage Two 
Stage Two introduces features of interregional financial relationships 
which. remain crucial throughout the subsequent stages. We shall 
accordingly devote full attention to them in this section. "* 
It is likely that the use of ba"nk money as means of payment will first 
bec_ome ~idesp·read in the Centre, and Centre banks will reach Stage Two 
while Periphery banks are still in Stage One. In mainstream theory the 
greater lending power of Stage Two banks speeds up the equalisation of 
returns to capital in the two types of region; in dependency theory the 
hegemony of the Centre over the Periphery is enhanced by its further 
development. 
If_ b~ the time Cen!re ~~nks reach Stag: Two, banking is still regionally 
d1st1nct, the banks ability to extend credit depends both on the size of the 
deposit ~ultiplier and on the multiplicand (reserves). These may both vary 
syst:mat1c~lly ~Y type of region; not surprisingly, the outlook for Periphery 
credit creation 1s not encouraging. 
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Th~ multiplier is greate~ ~he lo~er the reserve/ deposit and cash/ deposit 
rat,_os and the _Pr?pens1_t1es to import and to invest outside the region, 
while the mult1pllca~d 1s ~ete_rmined, in Stage Two, chiefly by exports 
(Do~, 1982). If t~e~e 1~ a high import content to investment expenditure, 
the income mult!plle~ 1~ the ~eriphery will be low, as will savings growth, 
and the redeposit ratio 1n Periphery financial institutions will also be low, 
as money returns to the Centre to pay for the imports. In addition, the stage 
of developm_ent_an~ the level of income being lower, the use of cash rather 
than dep~s1ts is hkely to be more widespread. Difficulty in retaining 
res~rves is exacerbated by the greater fluctuations in deposits in 
Periphery banks, caus~d by the v~latility of both investment in and export 
p~oceeds from the Periphery. Periphery banks will therefore at best need 
higher than average reserves (usually, Centre assets) and at worst are 
vulnerable to b~nkruptcy. Thus the competitive advantage lies with Centre 
bank~: there will be pressure towards banking concentration and branch 
banking by the Centre banks in the Periphery. 
It almost goes wi~hout saying that if the banks respond to pressures 
toward conce~trat1on, the banking centre and head offices will locate in 
~he Centre _(K1ndlebe~ger, 1974). This fact might be expected to limit 
1nv~stm~nt in the Per1p~ery ~ec~us~ of_ limited information on Periphery 
proJects in the Cen!re._ F1n~nc1al 1nst1tut1ons will tend to have head offices 
in ~he Centr~; th1~ u~pltes a remoteness from the business of the 
Periphery which will discriminate in favour of firms and projects in the 
Centre. 
The mor~ decision-making occurs in head offices or, a fortiori: in Centre 
ba~ks without bran~hes in t~e Periphery, the more likely it is, other things 
~e,ng equal, that 1nformat1on costs and transactions costs will bias 
1nvestm~nt toward the Centre i~stead of the Periphery. Bank managers' 
expectations of returns on investment, like the expectations of 
entrepr~neurs, ~ust rely significantly on group conventions. This 
con_vent1onal bas!s of ex_i>ectations can contribute to instability in the 
P_er1phery. From t,_me t~ time, convention may form an unduly optimistic 
view a~out potentra! garns fr~m Periphery projects, generating excessive 
expans1~n of ~redrt to . Periphery. The eventual disappointment of 
expectatrons will then bring about excessive withdrawal of credit. 
The mor_e remote the group is from first-hand information, the less reliable 
conventron~I expectations are likely to be. The best information available 
to head. offices of banks is likely to come from head offices of large 
cor~orat1ons, also located in the Centre. (Personal contact amongst 
b~s,ne~smen and banker~ in the Centre adds an extra, sociological 
d1men~1on to th_e for~at1on of conventional expectations and the 
allocation of cre~,t:) Bu_s,ness in the Periphery will tend to experience the 
same so~t of_ d1ff1c~lt1es in borrowing that beset small businesses, 
~ncou~ag1ng 1ndustr1al concentration in parallel with the tendency to 
f1nanc1al concentration. 
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A regional disparity in knowledge of potential investment projects creates 
a de facto separation of regional credit which persists even if in other 
respects the banks have reached a stage of integration, in this Stage 
through concentration or in later Stages by the pooling of reserves. 
Separation reinforces the cumulative causation explanation of disparities 
in regional growth and development. Differential knowledge is, of course, 
in strict contradiction to the unified and well-informed capital market of 
mainstream theory. Nor is there any suggestion of this factor in 
dependency theory. Centre bankers are either implicitly assumed to have 
good information about the Periphery and the markets for its products in 
the Centre, or Peripheral development is entirely governed not only by 
Centre lending policies but also by Centre entrepreneurship. The 
concentration of modern dependency theory on multinational 
corporations as the engines of development in both types of region would 
be compatible with information cost bias. 
However it will be appreciated that the Centre's ' information' relates to its 
own evaluation of Periphery investments. Thus, even considering the 
factors noted earlier, the continued existence of separate Periphery banks 
might just be to the Periphery's advantage. The following considerations 
were, in effect, the rationale for imposing by law a separation of banks by 
state boundaries in the United States. First, in order to maintain their local 
deposit base, Periphery managers will have an incentive to consider local 
marketability and thus to evaluate potential projects according to their 
value to the Periphery, rather than the Centre. Second, local banks are 
more likely to retain the deposits of Periphery residents if Centre banks do 
not compete in the Periphery. It can be seen that the reasoning is even 
more cogent when one is dealing (as in the U.S.) with several peripheral 
regions; there is no guarantee that money drained away from one such 
region to the Centre will find its way back as investment to the same 
peripheral region. In effect the U.S. legislation, only recently rescinded, 
retains some Stage One features in a banking system whose natural 
course is to progress to subsequent Stages. 
One can think of reasons why a regionally distinct banking system may not 
be an unmixed blessing to the Periphery; while such a system may guard 
against a monetary outflow to the Centre, Periphery banks are exposed to 
extra risk where Peripheral regions have, as they tend to do, quite 
specialised and strongly cyclical economies. Undiversified investment in 
these economies can amount to a particularly risky speculative venture 
which, as stated earlier, can leave the banks vulnerable to bankruptcy. 
Centre banks are better placed, by reason of their size and their better-
diversified loan portfolios, to lend to the Periphery. 
Their lending, however, may not be stable; indeed it may contribute to the 
Periphery's instability. The fluctuations of markets for Periphery products 
recommend Periphery assets as vehicles for speculation by wealth-
holders in the Centre. Speculation tends to be characterised by swings of 
excessive optimism and pessimism which may exacerbate the markets' 
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fluctuations. When speculators' expectations are shared by Centre 
bankers, cyclical variations in credit availability will add to the amplitude of 
the production cycle. 
The instability of the typical Peripheral economy not only leads to cautious 
investment by local banks and unstable credit from Centre banks; it also 
suggests that the Periphery will exhibit greater liquidity preference than 
!he Centre. Li_quidity preference influences the terms and availability of 
investment finance, as well as the demand for finance. Liquidity 
preference is better satisfied by deposits in nationwide or Centre banks. 
This reason for capital outflows from the Periphery to the Centre is 
exacerbated by the greater development of Centre financial markets. (See 
Mor_g~n, 1973, for an analysis of this phenomenon in Britain.) And higher 
l1qu1d1ty preference which takes the form of unwillingness to acquire 
Periphery assets weakens the market for those assets and adds to other 
sources of pessimism on the part of potential Centre investors. Further 
predicted manifestations of the Periphery's higher liquidity preference are 
a higher cash/ deposit ratio and a financial need, in addition to the need 
arising from a volatile real economy, for a higher reserve ratio for local 
banks. 
Overall, !o the extent t~at banking remains regionally distinct in Stage 
Two, Periphery banks will not be able to expand credit as readily as Centre 
ban_ks. Th~ countervailing force is the high overall returns perceived on 
Per_1ph_e_ry 1nvest~ents which serve Centre interests, despite the greater 
var1~b1l1ty of Periphery economies. These factors suggest that without a 
continued flow of fu_n~s from the Centre, income in the Periphery might 
even be lower than 1t 1s when dominated by Centre investment. 
4.3 Stage Three 
Once Stage Three is reached, banks extend credit to one another across 
region~; a shortag_e of re~erves in one region's banks may be made up by 
banks 1n other regions with an excess of reserves, provided the borrowing 
banks are th_ought creditworthy. If by this time there is interregional 
branch banking, these flows will occur, even more smoothly, within 
banks. 
Thus it may be thought that in Stage Three the question of whether banks 
r~tain t~eir regional identity is irrelevant except for the question of 
d1fferent1al knowledge explored above. However, while institutions 
become less regionally distinct, the regional distribution of reserves 
which reflect both regional investment opportunities and the banks: 
willingness to finance them, remain of central importance. The cause of 
changes in regional reserves is rooted in the regional balance of 
payments, though the relationship is now more complex. If local banks' (or 
local branches') reserves are inadequate because of a deficit on the 
regional balance of payments caused by imports of capital goods and raw 
materials for new production, Centre bank credit will be attracted in. But if 
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the deficit is due to a declining value of exports and/ or capital outflows, 
extra-regional loans are less likely to be forthcoming, and the Periphery's 
supply of reserves will be binding. 
Stage Three provides yet another spur to bank concentration and a further 
shift of power to the Centre, for although bank reserves are lent amongst 
banks in this Stage, branch banks have a competitive edge'. as re~er~e 
needs can be more easily balanced within a single bank. Even 1f banking in 
the Periphery is now done by branches of Centre banks, it is still the ca~e 
that the perceived value of Periphery credit must be high enough to Justify 
supporting it with reserves which might otherwise be used to expand 
credit to the Centre. 
4.4 Stage Four 
Once the banking system reaches Stage Four of its development, credit 
expansion is no longer necessarily constrained by a reserve base even at 
the level of the system as a whole: the central bank stands ready ~o meet 
reserve needs, at a price it sets. Aside from active monetary pohcy, the 
only limit to bank credit expansion is now the banks' willingn_ess to meet 
the demand for credit at an interest rate whose general level 1s set by the 
monetary authorities. 
Regional credit is no longer a matter of the alloc~tion ?fa gi~en nati?nal 
total of reserves. Credit-creation can now occur 1n regions with relatively 
high expected returns without inter-bank or inter-branch borrowing of 
reserves. Credit creation in regions usually short of reserves no lo_nger 
necessarily displaces credit in the surplus regions. T~e terms o! cred1_t are 
related to national monetary policy rather than regional cons1derat1ons. 
Kaldor's version of cumulative causation theory is compatible with this 
stage of banking development if the authorities are making reserves 
available at the going interest rate. 
The availability of reserves from a central monetary a_uthori_ty _does not 
however mean that the supply of credit to a region 1s unlimited. _The 
regional pattern of credit-creation is based on the p_attern of expect~t1~ns 
about real and financial assets on the part of potential borrowers, ex1st1ng 
wealth-holders and suppliers of new credit: the Keynesian specu_lative-
demand mechanism. The resulting credit-creation and investment in turn 
influence future expectations. 
The importance of the speculative-demand mechanism does not vary with 
the stages of banking development; it is the relative power of borrowers 
and lenders in the Centre and Periphery and the structure of real and 
financial assets which vary with the stage of banking. But it is easier _for 
shared expectations to have their full effect in a higher ~tage _of banking 
development, and the expectational factors are also working with an ever-
increasing capacity of the banking system to_affect !h~ ag_gregate amount 
of credit available. The more powerful credit mult1pher 1n turn supports 
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and intensifies the Keynesian income multiplier. Thus disparities in 
regional investment, income and employment are likely to be more 
marked over booms and slumps in the later stages of banking 
development. 
4.5 Stage Five 
The fifth stage of banking development has been reached in some- but by 
no means all - Western economies and in the international capital 
market. This stage is marked by the banks' actively seeking both lending 
opportunities and the deposits to balance their loans. 
Initially, competition for deposits was satisfied without undue rises in 
deposit rates as the new wholesale deposits seemed to fill a gap in the 
demand for liquidity. But eventually deposit rates rose considerably and 
hence loan rates also rose. Investment projects had, therefore, to have 
hig_h~r ~nd higher expected returns. In such circumstances, lending 
act1v1ty is concentrated in growth industries and in speculative assets. 
lnc~easing borrowin~ costs will discourage many investment projects 
which would otherwise have taken place; producers who have sufficient 
market power to pass higher borrowing costs on as higher prices are 
favoured. On the whole Periphery industries tend to be small and 
industries with market power located in the Centre; opportunities for 
financial speculation are also to be found in the Centre. 
This stage of banking reinforces the pattern of more volatile credit creation 
in _Pe_ripheral r~gions, a higher liquidity preference in the Periphery 
sat1_sf1ed by capita! outflows to the Centre, and the favouring of large, 
national corporate investors with better access to credit lines in the Centre 
and greater market power to pass on credit costs. Although the regional 
pattern of bank reserves is now purely notional, the forces which lead to 
interregional_ payments imbalances - changes in regional reserves, 
however notional - are still of primary importance in determining the 
regional pattern of credit demand and its supply. 
5. Conclusion 
The stages of banking approach has allowed us to construct hypotheses 
about the impact of financial factors on regional economic development. 
The likely course of financial development of the Centre and Periphery 
suggests that the remark, attributed to Joan Robinson, that it is better to be 
exploited than not to be exploited at all, applies to some regions whose 
resources are particularly suited to the needs of a Centre against which it 
can erect no infant-industry tariff barriers to help it diversify its economy. 
I~ t~e e_arly stages of_ banking development the issue is the regional 
d1str1but1on of the basis of credit: first savings, later reserves. As those 
constraints permit, credit is directed to regions where expected returns on 
investment are high. At the early stages of financial development, regional 
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financial constraints on investment are a serious issue. 
Credit-allocation decisions gravitate to the financial centre, generally the 
location of old wealth, progressively as financial institutions beco~e mo_re 
concentrated and attract the assets of those seeking liquidity. F1nanc1al 
concentration in turn normally goes hand in hand with concentration in 
production as credit-creation becomes increasingly centralised. 
Branch banking, interbank lending and the availability of a lend~r of last 
resort remove the reserves constraint on regional credit creation. The 
factors which earlier would have determined the regional reserves 
constraint now determine the net deposit creation resulting from the 
pattern of credit creation for a given region. A deficit in t~e regio~'.s 
balance of payments may not adversely affect credit creation 1f the def1c_1t 
is thought to be temporary, but if it is taken as an in?ic?tio~ ?f ec_onom1c 
stagnation, a reduction in credit will add to the regions d1ff1cult1es. 
As the financial sector in general becomes more developed, the tenden~y 
for Periphery deposits to be lost by capital outflows to the Centre will 
increase, particularly in periods of high liquidity preference. In general the 
Periphery experiences larger fluctuations in receipts for its products and 
closer financial constraints. For this reason, there tends to be a marked 
liquidity preference in the Periphery in times of recession, whic~ tends, as 
banking becomes more centralised, to be satisfied by holding assets 
issued in the Centre. The regional pattern of liquidity preference becomes 
a progressively more important factor in regiona) cr~?it creation as banks 
develop, especially as they enter the phase of hab1hty management. 
Although in the later stages of banking de_velopmen~ the reg_ional reserves 
constraint is no longer binding on regional credit creation, the ~ther 
aspects of financial development which characterise disparat~ reg1o~al 
development - the tendency toward financial (and _1ndus_tr1al) 
concentration, the growing importance of liquidity preference 1n reg1on~I 
money flows and credit allocation - ensure a continued asymmetry in 
regional credit creation and thus in regional development. 
Thus as a matter of policy the analysis of this paper disputes the wisdom, 
from the point of view of Peripheral regions, of the ~urren~ preference f~r 
unification of the capital market through deregulation. This ~reference is 
supported by neoclassical regional deve_lopme~t the?ry, which "':e have 
shown to be based on internally inconsistent f1nanc1al assumptions. 
There may be a trade-off between efficiency and equity i~ segmented 
financial markets, though we tend to the belief that in financial matters, a 
move towards unification, which improves micro-efficiency, ~ay be 
macro-inefficient: it may impede the relative development of Peripheral 
economies and encourage concentration which may benefit the Centre at 
the expense of the Periphery, but may not even serve _the lo~g-te~m 
interests of the Centre. Our analysis suggests that a policy of f1nanc1al 
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segmentation - if it is not already too late to consider-would need to be 
taken in conjunction with policies to encourage Periphery 
entrepreneurship and to discourage the wide fluctuations of the 
Periphery's product prices which result in generally pessimistic 
valuations of Periphery assets and projects. 
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The authors wish to thank Philip Arestis and the other members of the 
ed;torial board of Thames Papers in Political Economy, and A . P. Thirlwall 
for their comments and suggestions. 
The i~sues involved in choosing an approach to deal with a particular 
question are complex: general principles have been explored extensively 
elsewhere: Dow (1985), Whynes (1984). 
Ironically, Marx gave full scope for such a possibility, even in an exchange, 
as opposed to production, economy (1867, Chapter 3, Section 2a). 
If dependency theory seems unduly depressing, it should be remembered 
that there came a time when raising working-class incomes in order to 
bring workers into the market as consumers was perceived to be in the 
interest of entrepreneurs. The same principle may apply in the context of 
regional development. 
For results applicable to the international context, with a balance of 
payments constraint, see Dixon and Thirlwall (1975). 
But see Coghlan (1978) and Moore (1986) for a more historical approach. 
In the internat;onal sphere, the Currency Board system kept colonial 
?a~king systems dependent on the Centre for funds, thus both inhibiting 
1nd1genous economic development by restricting domestic credit creation 
and enhancing the power of the Centre to direct the course and pace of 
colonial development. 
American experience in the 1930s demonstrates this point, despite 
Federal Reserve System policy of discretionary support to Periphery banks 
in difficulty. However, Naylor (1975, Chapter 3), argues that the more 
balanced regional development in the United States as compared to 
Canada can be partly explained by the more segmented regulatory 
framework in the U.S. 
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